Are There Cost Differences in the Argentinean Pension Fund Industry? An Efficiency Frontier Analysis by Ferro, Gustavo & Romero, Carlos A.
 
Are There Cost Differences in the Argentinean Pension Fund 
Industry? An Efficiency Frontier Analysis 
Gustavo Ferro and Carlos A. Romero 


















Centro de Estudios Económicos de la Regulación 
Universidad Argentina de la Empresa 
Lima 717 
C1053AAO Buenos Aires, Argentina 






        Are there cost differences in the argentinean pension fund industry? an efficiency
frontier analysis / Gustavo Ferro y Carlos Romero. - 1a ed. - Buenos Aires : Ediciones 
UADE - Universidad Argentina de la Empresa, 2008. 
    16 p. ; 27x21 cm. - (Working Paper; 26) 
 
    ISBN 978-987-519-138-9           
 
    1. Economía. I. Romero, Carlos  II. Título 




Fecha de catalogación: 22/10/2008 
  2  3
Are There Cost Differences in the Argentinean Pension Fund 




Gustavo Ferro  
Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa (UADE) and CONICET, gferro@uade.edu.ar. 
 
Carlos A. Romero 





Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study the existence of differences in costs between pension fund 
administrators (PFAs) through the estimation of an econometric cost frontier for Argentina. Like in other eleven 
Latin American, and some other Central Asian and Eastern Europe countries, the social security has been privatized, 
and the individual accounts of defined contribution plans are managed by PFAs. The issue is relevant because of its 
potential regulatory implications. Cost savings (efficiency gains) could be passed-through to contributors, increasing 
their pension funds (that is, their pensions at retirement). The concept is applied to utilities’ regulation in countries 
where price-caps are applied, and an X-factor is set by the regulator to distribute the efficiency gains, but it is not the 
practice in privatized social security systems. In Argentina a price-cap has been introduced in pension funds markets 
since a 2007 reform. Though it allows the regulator to modify that cap,  in doing that no provision was established 
for a technically acceptable methodology. We show that the use of efficiency frontiers could fill the gap, because  it 
provides a technical tool to help in that key resource allocation decision. From the empirical work, it is found that 
there are important differences in efficiency among PFAs. This gives some clues to the regulator for implementing 
sector policies.  
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I. Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to determine the existence of differences in costs between Argentine 
pension fund administrators (PFAs) by the estimation of an econometric cost frontier. In 
Argentina, like in other eleven Latin American countries, the social security has been privatized. 
A defined contribution scheme was set, and the worker’s individual accounts are managed by 
PFAs. The results have a potential regulatory use, since a recent reform in 2007
1 established caps 
to the commissions of the funds, and gave the possibility of its periodic reset by the regulator, but 
no provisions were made in order to cope with the problem of how to reset commissions. 
The outputs of the PFAs comprise fund management (and account maintenance related activities) 
and under contracting (at the recent 2007 reform) of disability and death policies for the affiliates 
to the plans, made in life insurance companies. The reform established a common pool of 
resources to attend those risks since 2008 financed by a commission on accumulated funds 
Like other similar schemes inspired in the Chilean reform of 1981, the system has high 
commercial costs, since the “competition” in the industry acts by means of shifts of affiliates 
from one fund to another. The PFAs devote resources to earn shifts from other PFAs. That 
feature of the system has been severely criticized for analysts of the reforms, notably Barr (2000), 
and Orszag and Stiglitz (1999). 
Pension fund management could be provided at several cost levels. The industry is heavily 
regulated, as other financial services, and particularly provided it is sensitive because of its social 
goals (to provide consumption in the old age, and to cover invalidity, orphan and widowed 
benefits in case of death of the worker). Efficiency gains in a (generic) regulated industry could 
be passed-through to the consumers in the form of lower prices. Normally, pension fund 
industries are not subject to price-caps, like electricity or water services are in some countries. 
But in the particular case of Argentina, a recent reform introduced a cap in PFAs commissions, 
and determined that the regulator could modify such figure. Unlike in utilities industries, in PFA 
commissions are set as percentage points of the contribution rate, and they are automatically 
linked to the wage inflation. 
Could be imagined an X factor in this industry to pass-through efficiency gains? If the answer is 
“yes”, is there a method, technically reasonable and politically feasible to implement an 
automatic device to adjust regulated prices? We think the answer to both questions is “yes”. 
Efficiency frontiers methodology is a possibility, which has both advantages in our point of view. 
So our motivation is intellectually driven (to assess efficiency levels) but also policy oriented (to 
suggest a method for resetting commissions’ caps). 
There is not an exhaustive literature on efficiency frontiers methodology applied to pension 
funds, but is plenty of evidence in other financial services, like banking or insurance. In the 
pension fund industries –in particular in the Latin American version of this business, the 
precedents to this work are Braberman et al (1998), Barrientos and Boussofiane (2005), Ferro and 
                                                 
1 The Law 26.222 passed in 2007 was a reform which allow affiliates to pension funds to return to the pay-as-you-go 
public system, change the way invalidity and survivor benefits are financed, and set a cap on the commissions of the 
PFA. 
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Romero (2006b), Ferro (2007) and Ferro (2008). Braberman et al (1998) estimate a cost frontier 
in a more general analysis of the cost drivers and economies of scale of the system, with quarterly 
data of a couple of years of operation. In Barrientos and Boussofiane (2005), efficiency is 
analyzed with mathematical programming methods applied to the internationally well-known 
Chilean system, the older of this type of reform. Ferro and Romero (2006b) develop an efficiency 
frontier with a yearly frequency panel data for Argentina, to study the effects of the 
macroeconomic crisis of 2002. Ferro (2007), investigates the costdrivers in a set of Latin 
American countries which reformed their pensions. Ferro (2008) estimates a cost function for 
Argentina with the same database, which here we estimated the frontier.  
In the following section, a conceptual discussion is made concerning the features of the Argentine 
pension system and the existent literature on frontier estimations applies to PFAs. The 
methodological choices are also included. In section three, a discussion is made on PFAs’ relative 
efficiency. The fourth section is devoted to present the database and the results. Finally, the 
section five concludes.  
II.  Some features of the industry, model searching and methodological choices 
In twelve Latin American countries had been reformed the social security systems to introduce 
private pension funds, based on contributions to individually held accounts, on fully-funded 
schemes managed by pension fund administrators (PFA). The first reform was the Chilean in 
1981. Argentina was the fourth country, which reformed its public defined-benefits pay-as-you-
go system in 1994, after Chile, Peru and Colombia did. Twenty-five PFAs started a completely 
new market of financial services, and after a number of mergers and acquisitions, eleven remain 
at the beginning of 2008. They manage up to date around thirty billion dollars, from eleven 
million people.  
The activity PFAs develop consists in managing funds from mandated contributions (voluntary 
savings are admitted in addition) and in under contracting insurance to cover risks of invalidity 
and death. In this article we analyze only the first activity. PFAs compete between each other for 
the stock of existent affiliates and for the flow of new workers. The firms try to affiliate, to retain, 
and to earn shifts of affiliates from other PFAs, plus the new entrants to the labour market. With 
each old affiliate, which is incorporated to a PFA, their funds are also shifted. Each active 
contributor affiliated to a PFA, could shift to another one twice a year. 
PFAs spend in commercial and administrative expenses; they have to pay salaries, software, 
custody services, and a fee for the service of collecting of contributions to the tax authority, 
publicity and marketing. Fixed assets are relatively of less importance (offices and computers), 
and in some particular cases, they are shared with other financial institutions. The minimum 
mandated net worth to be allowed to operate by the regulatory authority is equivalent to one 
million dollars. 
Benefits of the system are paid as annuities or phased withdrawals. With the funds accumulated 
in the PFA, at the retirement age, the affiliate could contract an annuity from a retirement 
insurance company, or alternatively could maintained the money in the PFA and retire it at the 
same path as the annuity. This latter arrangement allows making a bequest with the remaining 
capital at the death of the affiliate (not possible in the case of the annuity), but at the same time 
when the money in the account is exhausted, the benefit ceases. The longevity risk remains in the 
insurance company in the case of the annuity and in hands of the pensioner in the case of the 
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phased withdrawals scheme. The retirement insurance providers of annuities and the life 
insurance companies offering coverage for invalidity and death risks in the majority of the cases 
belonged to the PFAs. 
For the Argentine case, which is the focus of this study, Ferro (2003) makes a detailed 
description and analysis. In Ferro and Romero (2006), a frontier approach is made, with panel 
data of annual frequency, attending the variability along the periods and those shifts related to 
regulatory changes and macroeconomic crisis.  
The pension fund industry started operations in Argentina on July 1994. Initially, twenty five 
operators were authorized to collect contributions, but some mergers reduced the number of 
funds to eleven nowadays. A panel dataset was elaborated with quarterly observations, for the 
period 1996-2006. 
As mentioned above, there is a lack of literature on efficiency frontiers applied to pension funds.  
Barrientos and Boussofiane (2005) develop efficiency measures for PFA in Chile using DEA 
(Data Envelopment Analysis). They identify the PFA performance, address the effects of the 
regulatory policies and discuss if the market pressure or the regulation explained the high costs of 
the pension funds. Recently, Pestana-Barros and Medeiros-Garcia (2006) study the case of 
Portugal. 
Braberman et al (1998), in an estimation of costs of the industry develop a frontier efficiency 
analysis, and analyze how a couple of regulatory reforms affected the costs of the industry, its 
efficiency and the relative position of the PFA in an efficiency ranking. They find that the lower 
the commercial costs were, the higher was the efficiency. In Ferro and Romero (2006b), two 
econometric models are estimated in order to assess efficiency, and the response to regulatory 
and macroeconomic shocks on the industry. It is found that efficiency levels decline after 1998 
up to 2001. From that year the average efficiency stays in lower levels than before 1999. There 
are not significant differences in ranking when comparing deterministic and stochastic models. 
III.  PFAs’ Relative Efficiency: Methodological Aspects 
Technological frontier studies can be classified according to the specification and estimation 
methodologies.  
Regarding specification, the problem can be approached from two different views: the production 
function and the cost function. The production function shows the output as a function of inputs, 
while the cost function shows the total cost of production as a function of output and input’s 
prices. One advantage of the cost function over the production function approach is the flexibility 
to adopt different specifications, particularly in the cases when the firm produces more than one 
product. Moreover, estimation of production function allows obtaining a measure of technical 
efficiency, but ignores locative efficiency problems. Estimation of cost frontiers, on the other 
hand, gives information on cost differentials due to technical and locative inefficiencies
2.  
Related to the estimation technology, both production and cost functions estimates can be 
obtained using statistical or mathematical programming methods. Non-statistical methods 
estimate frontiers (which can be parametric or non-parametric) without assumptions on the form 
                                                 
2 To separate these two effects it is necessary to formulate some additional assumptions. 
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of the distribution of the error term. The estimates, as a result, have no statistical properties, 
making it impossible to test hypothesis. In the case of estimates using mathematical 
programming, the frontier can or not be specified as a parametric function of inputs. The main 
advantage of non-parametric methods (also known as Data Envelopment Analysis or DEA for 
short) is that no a priori functional form is imposed to the data. The main disadvantage is that to 
estimate the frontier it uses only a subset of the available data (those actually determining the 
frontier), while the rest of the observations are ignored. 
Once a decision is made on which type of frontier -costs or production- is going to be estimated, 
and which technique -statistical or mathematical programming, is to be used, the following step is 
to decide on whether a deterministic or stochastic frontier is to be used.  
If a deterministic approach is chosen, the difference between a particular firm and the frontier is 
attributed to inefficiency. It is ignored the possibility that the performance of a firm might be 
affected not only by its own efficiency, but also by factors beyond its control (such as adverse 
climate conditions, regulatory shifts or macroeconomic crisis). An additional disadvantage of 
deterministic estimates is the high sensibility to outliers. A single outlier observation can have 
strong effects on the results. Moreover, increasing the size of the sample cannot solve the 
problems associated with the “outlier problem”. 
In traditional cost analysis the problem faced by the firm is to minimize total costs subject to 
delivering a given level of output. The solution to this problem generates an optimal set of inputs, 
which depend on output level and input prices. In the same way, it is possible to estimate the cost 
function of the firm, which depends only on output level and input prices. 
The resulting cost model specification is given by: C = f(Y,Z,PL,PK), where: C: total cost, Y: 
output, Z: n-dimension vector of other exogenous variables, PK: price of capital inputs, PL: price 
of labour inputs. The most common specification is the Cobb-Douglas function where the 
inefficiency terms (ε) enters into the model as a multiplicative factor, which turns into additive in 
the logarithmic form:  
 [1]     c =  α + β1 p1 + βk pk + γ0 y + ∑i γi zi + ε      
Where  βi and γi are parameters to be estimated and small cases represent logarithms of the 
variables presented above. 
The systemic part of the model determines the minimum achievable cost with a given set of 
outputs and environmental variables, and it is known as the cost frontier. According to the 
deterministic approach, the stochastic part of the model is completely included in the (in) 
efficiency term. Given that actual costs cannot, by definition, be lower than the frontier cost, the 
error term cannot be negative. Conceptually, the cost function defines a frontier, which envelops 
the technically feasible costs associated to particular sets of inputs and environmental 
characteristics. 
The firm with the min (εi) will be 100% efficient. For this firm εi is zero and therefore exp(εi) 
equals one. The larger the inefficiency of a particular firm i the term εi will be larger and the 
resulting efficiency measure closer to zero. 
In the case of stochastic frontiers, the cost function is similar to the one presented in [1], but now 
the error term ε is no longer equal to inefficiency, since it is decomposed into two terms. One 
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component is assumed to have a symmetric distribution, and the other component is assumed to 
have a strictly non-negative distribution:  
[2]     εi = ui + vi ,  
Where ui >0 and vi is not restricted.  
The vi term captures the effects of statistical noise and are assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed with an N(0,σ
2
v). The ui error term represents cost inefficiency and is 
assumed to be distributed independently of the vi and the regressors. Several functional forms 
have been proposed for the inefficiency term (Half-Normal, Truncated Normal, Gamma and 
Exponential), but the most common distribution used in empirical tests is the Half Normal. 
According to formula [1], a Cobb-Douglas logarithmic cost frontier includes as dependent 
variable total costs, and as independent ones, a variable indicative of the product or service the 
firm produces and sells, variables representative of input prices and environmental variables 
which captures the particularities of the market under examination. 
In the particular case of PFA cost function, the dependent variable was structured since 
accounting book data of the commercial plus the administrative costs of the administrators, where 
monetary values were deflated to values of the last period of analysis, using the CPI. The costs of 
the under contracting of the collective life insurance to deal with invalidity and death risks were 
not included
3.  
The choice of the variable that represents the product (in fact the service) of the industry is a 
complex task. It can be used a variety of variables, closely correlated each other. For example, 
affiliates (members of the pension plans, mandated to contribute), is the most direct candidate, 
since the costs are related to each personal account. The productive process consists in obtaining 
affiliates, opening and maintaining accounts, deliver periodical reports, clearing shifts of 
affiliates between PFA and marketing and publicizing the products. The contribution collection is 
under contracted to the Federal Tax Administration
4 (AFIP). Alternatively, it can be used 
contributors (that is, active accounts, since a number of affiliates could not been actively 
contributing, because of unemployment, transient participation in the informal labour market or 
contribution evasion –from the worker or from the employer-). An active account yields income 
to the PFA (the commissions are based on current contribution flows), but all accounts (active or 
inactive) yield costs, since the maintenance of the accounts and reporting its developments is 
mandatory. A third option for the product is the fund itself, which grows with the effort of the 
PFA. To set up and to manage the fund demands commercial and administrative costs and the 
contracting of personnel with heavy financial skills (but this costs are negligible in the total; this 
human capital is an almost fixed input and there are strong economies of scale of its contracting). 
With respect to the inputs, the industry employs labour and “capital”. The latter are tangible 
assets (like buildings and computers) and intangible ones (as software, commercial brands and 
                                                 
3 The activity of the PFA could be analyzed as a multiproduct one, providing directly the fund administration 
services, and under contracting the invalidity and death risks. The latter was made until the end of 2007 by means of 
a competitive auction with life insurance companies, but in practice, the majority of the times the provider is a 
satellite company of the PFA. Here we focus in the fund administration business, letting the life insurance one for 
another study. 
4 In other countries, the collection is responsibility of the PFA, for example, in Chile. 
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databases). Administrative labour is relatively fixed, it is not so with the commercial staff, which 
has an important turnover within the history of the system. Not having detailed information on 
salaries, an average was considered dividing the wage account on the sales force. For the 
“capital” input price a non-labour cost index was constructed, dividing non-labour costs on points 
of sale (“branches”). The unit “branch” is particularly important in this industry, since the duties 
the regulation mandate on certain commercial and administrative operations, which only can be 
made there; for example, affiliation or the shift to another fund. The variables constructed as 
indicative of the input prices follow the common practice in the literature to assess prices in 
utilities efficiency studies (Saal and Parker, 2005; Saal and Reid, 2004 and Saal et al, 2004).  
The environmental variables constructed, include dummies to capture the effects of important 
regulatory changes at the end of 1997, a huge macroeconomic crisis in 2001
5, a ratio between 
regular contributors and total affiliates, a lagged indicator of the shifts between PFA
6, an 
indicator of geographic concentration against national sparse coverage, another dummy to 
indicate fund yields over the average
7, other dummy differentiates market share over and under 
certain threshold, and finally, a dummy to recall commissions over and under the average
8. 
IV. Empirical  results 
Quarterly data for twenty-two PFA for the period September 1996 to December 2006 is obtained 
from the Superintendence of PFA (SAFJP). The system started in 1994 with twenty-five firms. 
During this period, there has been a strong merger activity. Currently, eleven PFA continue to 
operate, including a new entrant. Hence, the panel data is unbalanced. 
                                                 
5 In 2002, local currency was devalued up to 75% (January through July, appreciating in part later), local GDP fall 
11%, national government default on the public debt and a later “hair cut” on a swap operation affected the pension 
funds because of its exposure to public debt. Contributions were transiently reduced, affecting the cash flow of the 
PFA and the unemployment rate went roughly to a quarter of the labor force, hitting on the contribution flows. 
6 In this market, affiliates are captive contributors, but into the system they could shift between PFAs twice a year 
under the condition of regularity in their contributions. Recently, it was established the possibility of move once on 
five years to a public pay-as-you-go defined benefits public system which survives to the reform, initially to retain 
elder affiliates and as a political transaction to pass the legislation (the reform was –and continues to be- heavily 
rejected by politicians, a fraction of the media, the unions and a great deal of common citizens). Related with the cost 
drivers, in this artificial market a mimic of competition was established between providers by means of the 
possibility of shift the affiliation to another PFA. That option could be exercised twice a year, and the PFAs devote a 
lot of resources to yield a favorable balance between negative and positive shifts (outside and inside the proper PFA). 
The process if complex and takes time, since shift could be objected and a final clearing is made to trespass the 
resources in the funds. Because of the former, past shifts explain current costs, since an initial level of expenses is 
made to add the newcomers. 
7 In an efficient market, yields of the funds tend to converge. Here, financial efficiency of the market is not tested 
(since it is reasonable to suspect it is not so), but is worth noting that the regulation imposes strong constraints to 
portfolio composition (including a 90% “home biased” assets), and that a minimum return is imposed to the funds 
(0.7 times the average), which in case of not accomplishment implies penalties to the funds -which have to cover the 
losses with their own resources-. Then the regulation –and not the financial efficiency of the market- tend to uniform 
the portfolios. Nevertheless, there are differences into the PFA’s yields. 
8 Until 2000 it was possible to combine fixed and variable commissions on contribution flows. Some PFAs were 
specialized on high wages affiliates by means of combining high fixed and low variable fees. Since 2000 it is only 
possible to charge variable commissions, which are neutral in terms of client composition of the funds. 
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The variables in use were total costs (administrative plus commercial), affiliates, average wages, 
a cost-index for non-labour costs and some dummies and ratios specially designed. Table 1 
presents the descriptive statistics. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimates.  
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Total Costs ($ Dec.06)  19.380.040 17.461.867 1.010.710  68.835.329 
Affiliates (number)  621.694 599.130 20.473  2.337.401 
Wages ($ Dec.06 per quarter)  12.963 5990 3.154  86.001 
Non-labour cost price index ($ Dec.06) 173.369 174.308 5.492  1.924.434 
Contributors / Affiliates  0.42 0.10 0.22  0.76 
Positive Shifts (number)  2.887 3.107 0.00  18.586 
Source: Own elaboration 
The variables (in logs) included were: total costs, in real terms (lrcostot), affiliates (lafilt), 
average salary paid per “promoter” (sales force), in real terms (lrsala), average non labour cost 
per point of sale, in real terms (lrpk), ratio between actual contributors and affiliates in each 
period (ratio) and positive shifts of affiliates to each PFA, lagged one quarter (ltrpot_1). 
Additionally, some dummy variables were taken into account:  dummy for 2002 macroeconomic 
crisis, being 1 in the crisis quarters (crisist), dummy for regulatory changes of 1997, being 1 since 
the first quarter of 1998 (regut), dummy to denote the market share of the PFA in each quarter, 
being 1 when that share is 10% or over (dummysharet), dummy to denote the relative 
commission charged with respect to the average in each quarter, being 1 the average or higher 
(dummycoret), dummy to indicate fund yields equal or greater to average in each quarter (annual 
accumulated), being 1 the average or higher (dummyrenret), dummy being 1 for those with 
national coverage (dummygeog). 
We estimated three models: a basis Model (M1), and two alternative models with environmental 
variables (M2 and M3). Estimates are in all the cases Cobb-Douglas in logarithms. In the “Basis” 
M1, not all the variables result significant. The re-estimation of the model with “Old 
Environmental” M2, yield the same set of significant variables than in the original (annual) 
estimation (Ferro and Romero, 2006 b). In turn, the “New Environmental” M3, required the 
elimination of two dummies, which were not significant. 
In the M1, lcostot = f(lafilt, lrsala, lrpk). The signs of the coefficients are as expected positive for 
the three dependent variables. Both, lafilt and lrpk are significant at the 99% level, but lrsala is 
not significantly different by zero. The formula of M1 was constructed according to the economic 
theory. But the sector has some specific features, which influence the costs. 
A first approach to address those environmental features was employed in Ferro and Romero 
(2006), with annual data and we recalled here those results, adapting the M2 model to the 
quarterly database in use. To the former “theoretical” cost drivers, included in M1, we add three 
new variables, which reflect empirical developments in the market under study. The dummy 
crisist was thought to capture the effects on the sector of the huge macroeconomic crisis of 2002. 
The crisis affected the system in various ways: contribution rates were transiently reduced, shifts 
between PFA were delayed, portfolio suffered the devaluation of the currency and the default on 
public debt and the pension funds cut jobs and close branches. A second dummy, regut, was used 
in Ferro (2003) to assess the influence of regulatory changes on costs, reflecting a great reform in 
1997 which modified the way the PFA compete each other. The third additional variable was 
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ltrpot_1, introduced in Ferro and Romero (2006) to capture the impact on costs of the periodical 
clearing of affiliates arising from voluntary shifts from one PFA to another. When this first subset 
of environmental variables is included in the model, all variables become significant at the 99% 
level (including lrsala), and the signs of the dependent variables estimate coefficients are as 
expected. Both dummies have negative sensibilities, reflecting that either the regulatory changes 
or the crisis reduced costs. 
But M2 seems to us very specific to the history of the system. Is it possible to reach a model 
more robust to the industry characteristics? Moreover, is it possible to develop a model, which 
can be applied to other countries with similar pension fund market design? We try to construct 
environmental variables more related with the features of the market throughout the whole period 
of its functioning. Instead of the dummies to capture specific historic developments, we construct 
four dummies trying to address the market share position of the PFA, the charges to the affiliates 
–in relation with the average charge of the industry-, the relative return of each fund related to the 
industry average, and the geographic coverage of each PFA (national or local). The geographic 
and the relative return of the funds dummies were not significant and they were drop from the 
model. In the “New Environmental” (M3) another variable was added: the ratio 
contributors/affiliates. All the set of new environmental variables seems relevant from a sector 
point of view of the industry. So, a priori, M3 is a better description of the market. Once 
estimated M3, the signs of the explanatory dummies indicating market share, relative charges and 
the ratio are all positive: the bigger the market share and the higher the commissions, the higher 
are the total costs. And the ratio increases costs too, implying that active contributors demand 
more expenses from the PFAs than affiliates (figure which includes active and non active 
contributors). 
The signs of the estimated coefficients are reasonable and robust to all the specifications. The 
absolute magnitudes of the coefficients are robustly enough between specifications. The values of 
Gamma are 0.899 for M1, 0.881 for M2 and 0.786 for M3, and the estimated standard error are 
0.037, 0.420 and 0.059 respectively. These results suggest than the vast majority (around 80%) of 
the residual variation is due to the inefficiency effect ui. See table 2 for the results. 













Lafilt 0.276* 0.249* 0.331* 
Lrsala        0.041   0.111* 0.097* 
lrpk2 0.115*  0.084* 0.094* 
Crisist -0.138*  
Regut -0.129*  




_cons 9.454* 8.575* 6.771* 
N 575 563 563 
Gamma 0.899 0.881 0.786 
(Std. Dev. 
Gamma) 
(0.037) (0.420) (0.059) 
Source: Own elaboration 
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One step ahead is the assessment of efficiency ratios and rankings of PFAs by its level. The first 
places correspond to the little PFA, which started with the system and were merged later. They 
had a lighter structure than the current operators. With this method we obtain an average measure 
of all the periods to each PFAs. 
The results of the three models (see Table 3) show that it is an increasing average level of the 
efficiency captured by the model when we pass from M1 through M3. Standard deviation of the 
efficiency levels is lower in M3 than in M2, and also in M2 than in M1. 
The positions in the table are robust, since the correlation between the places in M1 and M2 
rankings is 0.99, between M1 and M3 reaches 0.95 and between M2 and M3 is 0.96. 
 
Table 3:Efficiency levels and rankings 
Efficiency Rankings  PFA 
M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 
PFA_1  0.902 0.922 0.923 4 4 2 
PFA_2  0.143 0.217 0.243 17 17 21 
PFA_3  0.933 0.944 0.913 2 2 3 
PFA_4  0.707 0.767 0.766 7 8 8 
PFA_5  0.086 0.143 0.292 22 22 20 
PFA_6  0.704 0.775 0.799 8 7 6 
PFA_7  0.502 0.547 0.492 11 11 13 
PFA_8  0.460 0.427 0.425 12 14 14 
PFA_9  0.440 0.497 0.528 13 12 11 
PFA10  0.271 0.342 0.350 16 16 16 
PFA11  0.831 0.827 0.780 6 6 7 
PFA12  0.960 0.965 0.961 1 1 1 
PFA13  0.102 0.163 0.326 20 20 17 
PFA14  0.577 0.650 0.705 10 10 9 
PFA15  0.143 0.212 0.228 18 18 22 
PFA16  0.099 0.157 0.303 21 21 19 
PFA17  0.874 0.901 0.890 5 5 5 
PFA18  0.367 0.457 0.514 14 13 12 
PFA19  0.310 0.399 0.396 15 15 15 
PFA20  0.105 0.170 0.309 19 19 18 
PFA21  0.626 0.701 0.697 9 9 10 
PFA22  0.914 0.937 0.901 3 3 4 
 
Average  0.503 0.551 0.579 




M1-M2 = 0.9954  
M1-M3 = 0.9548  
M2-M3 = 0.9627 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
A simple analysis (Bauer et al, 1998) shows that, as expected in an intra-methodology case, 
results are consistent. Average efficiencies are similar among the three models, and especially 
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between M2 and M3. With respect to rankings, they are highly correlated (at a level of 
significance of 1%). 
It is important to remark that, as usual, the consistency is broken when considering alternative 
estimation methods. We performed DEA estimations using CRS and VRS models. We use 
affiliates as output and total costs as input and we included the ratio between contributor and 
affiliates as a neutral environmental variable. The results between econometrics and DEA are 
significatively different. The average DEA efficiencies are below the obtained through the 
stochastic frontier (average DEA efficiencies of 0.34 and 0.39 for CRS and VRS models, 
respectively). Regarding the rankings, they are all not significant (at 10% level) when comparing 
between methodologies. 
V. Concluding  remarks 
The present study uses a stochastic cost frontier approach to investigate the efficiency of 
Argentinean pension fund administrators during the period 1996 to 2006. The current paper 
extends existing empirical work in this area in the following ways. First, it incorporates the 
regulatory discussion, common to public services, to the social security sector emphasizing the 
importance of implementing methods of benchmarking among the pension fund administrators in 
order to limit the asymmetry of information. Second, we obtain econometric estimations of 
efficiency levels, using a previous search for a model that best represents this industry cost 
drivers. This last procedure is really important because, unlike public services, there is no a 
generally accepted model in the existent literature applied to pension funds. The results gives 
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